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SLOVAK LUTHERAN SOCIAL ETHICS, PAST AND PRESENT
by Vasil Gluchman

Vasil Gluchman (1959) is Professor of Ethics at the Presov University
in Presov (Slovakia). He has been appointed Visiting Professor at the
University of Akron (1994) and Masaryk Fellow at the University of
London (1996-1997). He published the books: Etika
konzekvencializmu [Consequentialist Ethics] (1995), Etika socialnych
dosledkov a jej kontexty [Ethics of Social Consequences and Its
Contexts] (1996), Slovak Lutheran Social Ethics (1997), Etika
socialnych dosledkov v kontextoch jej kritiky [Ethics of Social
Consequences in Contexts of its Critique] (1999) and Human Being
and Morality in Ethics of Social Consequences (2003).
Since 1989 Slovak Lutheran theology and ethics, including social ethics, have
been attracting more and more attention, not only in Slovakia, but also abroad.
Recent works dealing with this theme reflect this rising interest.1 In his review of my
book, Paul Brndjar makes several critical remarks that I would like to address here.
On the one hand, I would like to explain the approach I took when writing my book.
On the other hand, I would like to point out that after 1989 Slovak Lutheran ethics
got its second wind. It does not merely confine itself to examining questions of the
past, but also tries to offer all people (not just Lutherans or other Christians) answers
to topical moral questions and problems that concern them now.
When writing my book Slovak Lutheran Social Ethics, I tried to present to the
American reader the intellectual richness of the social ethics of Slovak Lutherans
mainly of the twentieth century because this century (and especially its second part)
is, from my perspective, the most interesting and also the most important. In my book
I do not deal with Slovak Lutheran ethics of the nineteenth century, the only
exception being two works by J. A. Fabry, published in 1898 and 1899, which are,
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however, put into the intellectual context of the early years of the 20th century since
Fabry’s works represent the beginnings of the Slovak Lutheran ethics of this century.2
In my opinion, the main value of my book lies in the fact that it examines the
theoretical contribution of Slovak Lutheran philosophy and theology to the
intellectual richness of the Slovak nation. I am a philosopher and an ethicist and that
is why it is quite natural that I did not concentrate in my book on examining the
theological problems discussed by Slovak Lutheran theologians. For the same reason,
I also did not present detailed analyses of the political, ideological, cultural, social
and economic aspects of the situation in twentieth century Slovakia. I mention these
aspects in my work only to the extent necessary for explaining a given opinion. In the
history of philosophical and ethical thinking, if we, for example, discuss Aristotle’s
or Kant’s ethics, we do not analyse their opinions from the perspective of the
complex political, economic, ideological, or social context of the era they lived in.
Also, it is not necessary to compare their opinions with all of the then existing
intellectual streams. In my book I concentrate exclusively on the ethical debates
appearing in the intellectual milieu of Slovak Lutherans, because in Slovakia during
the entire given period, there was an absence of any real philosophical and ethical
debates that could be placed into a wider ecumenical context—not to speak of the
lack of any discussions with non-religious, philosophical and ethical intellectual
circles. Such discussions started to appear in greater number only in the 1990s.
As a philosopher who deals primarily with the history of ethical thinking in
Slovakia, I mainly examined the intellectual wealth present in Slovak Lutheran ethics
and its theoretical contribution to the history of philosophical and ethical thinking in
Slovakia. I focused especially on the theoretical solving of the ethical and moral
problems that appeared in Slovak Lutheran ethics in the twentieth century and which
were reflected in this ethics. For this reason, I did not examine, in any specific way,
the period of the Second World War, because only one significant work in Slovak
Lutheran ethics appeared during that time, the work of Emil Boleslav Lukac, which I
discussed in the context of the development of Slovak Lutheran social ethics in the
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first half of the twentieth century.3 Besides this work, the period of the Second World
War did not produce any other significant theoretical contribution to the history of
philosophical and ethical thinking in Slovakia.
The real development of Slovak Lutheran social ethics appears only after the
Second World War (in 1946-1948), and, after a certain break, again in the later
1960s. However, Slovak Lutheran social ethics underwent the most significant
development only in the 1980s. Therefore, I paid the greatest attention in my book to
this period in the history of Slovak Lutheran social ethics. I really believe that in this
period we can find its most important theoretical contribution to the history of ethical
and philosophical thinking in Slovakia in the twentieth century. This is true despite
the political and ideological situation that dominated Slovakia, and Czechoslovakia in
the given period, but which at that time was already influenced by many positive
changes resulting from the politics of perestroika. These positive changes allowed the
more expressive voices of a group of mature Slovak Lutheran theologians dealing
with the problems of social ethics to be heard, for example, K. Gabris, K. Nandrasky,
D. Ondrejovic and I. Kiss. I. Kiss continues this up to the present day and in his
works he concerns himself with currently topical moral and ethical problems.4 His
work in the fields of ethics and especially theology has been praised also, for
example, by Paul R. Hinlicky.5
Kiss’s newest work Jezisova kazen na vrchu v zivote krestana. Eticke
problemy 5. kapitoly Evanjelia podla Matusa [Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount in the Life
of the Christian. Ethical Issues in the Fifth Chapter of the Gospel according to
Matthew] (2002) can be called a compendium of contemporary Lutheran Christian
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ethics because it deals with and looks for answers to some moral questions
concerning the everyday life of the Christian (and not only of the Christian). In the
case of this book it is certainly justified to speak about Christian ethics and not
merely about morality because Kiss bases his arguments on the fifth chapter of the
Gospel according to Matthew, which speaks about what the Christian should be and
not what he is. Precisely this book brings Slovak Lutheran ethics into discussion with
other philosophical, ethical and intellectual opinions in Slovakia, because Kiss’s
opinions transcend their religious and denominational framework and become
interesting also for people outside the Lutheran (or other Christian) milieu.
I base my ideas about ethics and morality on an emphasis of the role and
significance of the consequences of our behaviour and conduct for our morality and
virtue (see chapter 1 in my book Slovak Lutheran Social Ethics, or my other work
Human Being and Morality in Ethics of Social Consequences).6 That is why I was
attracted by the starting point of Igor Kiss’s discussion, according to which in ethics
it is not right to fulfil any requirement dogmatically, without considering given
circumstances. He claims that it is always necessary to take into consideration the
possible consequences of certain conduct.7 I really believe that the ethics and
morality of the Christian, or of any sensible person, cannot be based just on extreme
positions, expressed as an either/or, which are supposedly valid always and
everywhere, in any circumstances, regardless of the situation in which the person
finds himself/herself in, and regardless of the possible consequences of decisions.
Kiss bases his reflections on the ethics of the contemporary Christian, as well
as on the opinion of Martin Luther who ‘believed that the Sermon on the Mount
applies to every Christian only in his individual ethics, but not in social ethics (when
he has to act as soldier, policeman, judge, economist, politician)’.8 Therefore,
according to Luther, the Christian acting in accordance with the ethics of the Sermon
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on the Mount must be humble in the face of God and before people; he must respect
everybody and not feel superior; he must know how to endure suffering; he must be
mild, tender, kind; should yearn for justice and support everything that is pure, good,
just and fair; he should spread peace. However, as we will see later, Kiss, in
presenting his argument, partially modifies this starting position based on Luther’s
opinion by not separating individual and social ethics so strictly.
According to Kiss, the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount is the ethics of love
that needs to be spread into the world as a part of the world’s humanization, which is
already happening.9 This is a very interesting thesis that corresponds with my opinion
that during its historical and moral development, humankind has achieved a certain
moral progress, which can be expressed in Kiss’s terminology as a certain
humanization of humankind. But I am not completely sure if the claim that
humankind has undergone the process of humanization is completely accurate,
because human history shows many examples that contradict that belief. That is why
it seems to be more appropriate to speak about a certain moral progress of
humankind, while accepting the fact that new forms of moral evil still develop, and to
say that progress (in Kiss’s terminology ‘humanization’) is reflected in the fact that
the good preserves, thanks to our effort, a certain primacy over evil; a primacy that
perhaps increases, but only very, very slowly.
In Kiss’s view, the Christian should follow in his life the principles of the
Sermon on the Mount, such as love, rightness, equality, mercy, peace, service, truth,
and the preservation of life. Christian ethics, then, in his opinion, does not have only
a transcendental and after-life dimension, but also an immanent and worldly
dimension. He believes that already in this life we can partially experience our
salvation by God if we live according to the ethical principles of the Sermon on the
Mount.10 It is acting according to these principles that contributes to the humanization
of the world, regardless of whether the acts are performed by Christians or ‘secular
people’.
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In his reflections on the ethical and moral message of the fifth chapter of the
Gospel according to Matthew, Igor Kiss pays great attention to the analysis of
individual commandments that concern the ability to control anger and hatred, love of
one’s enemy, the problem of marital infidelity and divorce, the careless vow and
vengeance. He rejects the possibility of taking justice into one’s hands. His reactions
to these questions reflect the belief that the Christian should primarily strive for love,
peace and quietude, but this does not mean to be passive, or not to resist evil by
violence, or to lapse into some form of quietism. Kiss bases his belief on the fact that
‘in the realm of individual ethics the Christian should be a person of the Sermon on
the Mount – mild, forgiving, kind, gentle. But if he faces things that are not
acceptable in ecclesiastical or social life, he must know how to be strict, to stand on
principle, and, if necessary, to fight vigorously against evil. These two ethics are not
in mutual conflict since God also acts in this way: he is kind sometimes and strict at
other times.’11
I had some minor doubts about Kiss’s opinions on the possibility of punishing
evil, since he writes that it is the role of judicial authorities and police to punish an
evil act, which makes the search for personal retribution unacceptable. God’s anger at
the wrongdoer can be expressed also through secular authorities. The punishing of the
aggressor is not a part of individual ethics but of social ethics. It is the concern of the
secular authorities to act against evil.12 But later he states: ‘At the moment when the
Christian is attacked by someone, he has to defend himself. In that case the attacked
one represents the non-present secular authority and resists evil on behalf of that
authority’.13 I believe that this statement presents a very good solution, dispersing the
doubts that I have formulated above. Kiss believes that, in principle, the punishment
of evil is to be performed by secular authority and, as such, it belongs to the sphere of
social ethics. However, when an individual is attacked, he has to fight back and act on
behalf of the non-present secular authority. It seems to me that it is relatively often
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that an individual can, or must act on behalf of the non-present secular authority, and
Kiss provides a moral justification for such acting.
Defence against evil is not at the centre of individual ethics, but if necessary,
an individual can, or must take over the duties of secular authority and, through his
action, handle the problems that belong to the sphere of social ethics. This conclusion
is certainly not a result of a misconception in Kiss’s argumentation, since human
beings participate in both individual as well as social ethics. This is exactly the point
in which Kiss modifies his opening thesis based on Luther’s view. In this respect, we
can also reflect on the question of when a person’s action falls into the sphere of
individual ethics and when it falls into the sphere of social ethics. I think that it is not
possible to draw a clear line between the types of action that fall undoubtedly into the
sphere of individual ethics, and the types of action that fall, equally undoubtedly, into
the sphere of social ethics. Exactly for this reason I appreciate Kiss’s modification of
the original thesis.
In my book Slovak Lutheran Ethics I write that from the perspective of the
ethics of social consequences, it is necessary to approach religion through its socialethical dimension that reflects its ability to help believers to live a this-worldly life. I
formulated my opinion on religion and the Church on the basis of how religion and
the Church help people to live in the present day world, to find orientation in the
complex problems of the present. I write there that from the perspective of the ethics
of social consequences, I judge the social-ethical side of religion and the Church on
the basis of the social consequences that the impact of religion and the Church brings
to people and to society.14
Also on the basis of such a formulation of the criterion, it is possible to
perceive Kiss’s work as certainly valuable not only from the perspective of Slovak
Lutheran Christian ethics (as it really helps the search for the solution of everyday
moral problems face by Lutheran Christians), but also from a wider perspective,
because it offers certain guidelines for all good-willed people, explaining how to
humanize the world; how to achieve moral progress on the individual level as well as
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how to solve some moral problems on the social level. I believe that it is a
compendium of Christian ethics that has something to say not only to Christians, but
(since neither its content nor its impact can be reduced only to religion and believers)
also to others because with its message aimed at the actualisation of universal moral
values it concerns all people. That is why I believe this work to be a very positive
theoretical (but not only theoretical) contribution of Slovak Lutheran ethics to the
history of Slovak philosophy and ethics at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
and also to the philosophical (ethical) discussion in Slovakia.
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